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INTRODUCTION
The lovely double entendre in the title of Dean Roger L. Martin's book, Fixing the
Game: Bubbles, Crashes, and What Capitalism Can Learn from the NFL,I encapsulates
Martin's argument that the American system of business and capitalism is rigged, but can
still be repaired.2 Drawing on an unlikely source-an analogy to the National Football
League (NFL)-Martin argues that business should shift its focus away from the
"expectations market" (i.e., in football, the betting world, and in business, the stock
market, where stock prices reflect investor expectations of future performance) and back
to the "real market" (i.e., in football, the game on the field, and in business, the creation
of products and services). 3
Martin contends that the business world's overemphasis on the expectations market
leads to the sacrifice of long-term business growth in favor of higher short-term stock
* Professor of Law & Bion Gregory Chair in Business Law, University of California Hastings College of the
Law. I am indebted to John Crawford for his valuable feedback on a prior draft of this Article and to Dave
Consolazio, Courtney Field, and Harry Field for their insights regarding the NFL.
1. ROGER L. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM CAN LEARN
FROM THE NFL (Harvard Business Review Press 2011).
2. See generally id.
3. Id. at 37-38.
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prices;4 incentivizes inauthentic and amoral behavior by executives and other market
players who withhold or manipulate information through earnings management, pumping
of the stock price, and accounting fraud or otherwise; 5 entices market players to create
economic volatility, which enables them to "tak[e] advantage of less-sophisticated
investors while creating no net value for society;"6 and creates a "downward spiral" in
which market players try to increase their piece of a "finite pie" at the expense of other
market players rather than trying to expand the size of the pie by creating societal goods.7
That is, American capitalism's expectation-market orientation destroys shareholder value
rather than increasing it. In contrast, Martin argues that reorienting business toward the
real market could provide an "opportunity to build for the long run ... and produce
sustainability"; restore authenticity in our executives; reduce volatility and the influence
of parasitic market players; and create more value for customers and society, making
everyone (including shareholders) better off.8 To accomplish this reorientation, Martin
makes several specific recommendations, 9 the unstated upshot of which is to recommend
that businesses remain private to the extent at all possible.
Fixing the Game makes powerful and persuasive arguments. Martin's analogy
between business and the NFL is quite useful, and not solely for the substantive lessons
Martin distills. In addition, the analogy makes the debate about corporate governance
accessible to a wider audience, 10 gives this audience a more familiar lens through which
it can understand the sometimes arcane aspects of business law and practice, and enables
each member of this audience to draw on her sense of good sportsmanship in order to
develop her own intuitions about what constitutes fair business practices. Moreover, the
analogy can help even sophisticated businesspeople better appreciate some of the flaws of
the system in which they operate.
However, the analogy between business and the NFL is far from perfect. Martin
clearly acknowledges this,11 but a more thorough exploration of the flaws of the analogy
will help to refine the analysis. Thus, this Article challenges three1 2 aspects of the
analogy and discusses how these challenges ought to alter Martin's recommendations.
4. Id. at 29.
5. Id. at 36.
6. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 36.
7. Id. at 32, 34.
8. Id. at 71, 80-81.
9. Id. at 37-41.
10. NFL football reaches an enormous market. Over 111 million viewers watched the NFL Super Bowl in
2012, and the 2010-12 Super Bowls are the "three most-watched programs in U.S. television history." Richard
Deitsch, Super Bowl XLVI Sets Viewership Records, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 6, 2012, 3:33 PM),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/football/nfl/02/06/tvratings.record/index.html.
I1. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 14.
12. In the NFL, a coach throws a red flag in order to indicate that he wishes to challenge the referee's
ruling on the field (e.g., as to whether a catch was completed in-bounds or as to whether the ball crossed the
plane of the goal line for a touchdown). This use of the red flag in the NFL explains the title of this piece.
Teams are generally allowed two challenges per game, but if a coach makes and wins both challenges, he
becomes entitled to a third challenge, for a maximum of three challenges per team in a regulation game. See
2012 OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE R. 15 § 9 (2012), available at
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/rulebook/pdfs/1 8_Rule l5_Officials Jurisdictions and Duties.p
df (covering instant replays and coaches' challenges). Taking an optimistic view of the persuasiveness of my
first two challenges, I make three challenges in this Article.
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First, imperfection in the analogy between shareholders and sports bettors suggests a
stronger condemnation of hedge funds and the derivatives market than of the traditional
stock market. Second, the limitations of the analogy between business executives and
NFL players weaken Martin's case against the use of stock compensation for executives.
Third, the flaw in the analogy between business customers and NFL fans suggests that a
reorientation of business toward the maximization of "customer delight" is unrealistic
and perhaps unwise, particularly if the business needs capital. Ultimately, the intent of
this Article is not to reject Martin's recommendations; rather, the goal of this Article is to
help refine and further Martin's work as we face the daunting tasks of reforming
corporate governance and growing the economy.
I. CHALLENGE #1: SHAREHOLDERS, SPORTS BETrORS, AND THE DANGERS OF THE
EXPECTATIONS MARKET
Martin analogizes shareholders to sports bettors and capital markets brokers to
bookies,13 and he uses this analogy to argue that, just as the NFL's business decisions are
not driven primarily by the expectation (sports betting) market, American business should
not be driven primarily by the expectation (stock) market. 14 Instead, he argues that, in
both cases, the real market should be the focus. This is the main theme of the book, and
this view motivates Martin's specific recommendations discussed in Part II and Part III.
However, this argument suffers from a flaw in the analogy. There is an important
difference between shareholders and sports bettors. Shareholders are owners of the
underlying enterprise, while sports bettors are not. A sports bettor makes a naked wager,
with no real stake in the enterprise, which makes a sports bettor more analogous to a
trader in derivatives1 5 than to someone who merely owns stock of a corporation. Thus,
when Martin uses a sports betting analogy to argue that catering to the expectations
market poses tremendous dangers, his argument resonates more strongly in the context of
the derivatives market (particularly where the positions are used primarily for speculation
rather than hedging)16 than in the context of the traditional stock market.
A. Appreciating that the Starting Point Matters
While both a stock's price and a game's spread reflect projections about an outcome,
the value of a stock is derived not only from the expectations of future earnings, but also
from the value of the underlying assets. 17 That is, a sports bettor cares only about
13. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 16.
14. Id at 17-26, 37-38.
15. For example, selling a company's stock short is effectively betting against the company. Very
generally, someone who sells stock short borrows the stock, sells it to a third party (say, for $50 per share), and
at some later date (say, Date X) must return the stock (with interest) to the party from whom it was borrowed.
The short seller makes money if the stock declines in value in the interim; for example, if, as of Date X, the
stock is trading at $30 per share, the individual can acquire the stock he needs (for purposes of returning the
borrowed stock to the lender) for just $30 per share. In this example, the individual makes approximately $20
per share (less interest and fees) because the stock declined in value-that is, the investor won his bet against
the company.
16. References herein to investors in derivatives generally assume that the investor is not using the
derivative to hedge his position with respect to the underlying reference obligation, which he also owns.
17. A slightly different way of saying this is that stock price reflects expectations about a company's total
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whether performance expectations are met (for example, did Team X beat the spread?),
whereas a stockholder cares also about the starting point for setting those expectations
(for example, is Team Xa good team with a lot of wins or a bad team with no wins?). To
illustrate, consider an example that Martin uses, comparing the 2007 New England
Patriots and the 2007 Cleveland Browns. 18 The Patriots, who were unbeaten in the
regular season, covered the spread on games only 10 out of 16 times, whereas the
Browns, who had a 10-6 regular season record, covered the spread 12 times. 19 Martin
argues that, if the expectations market mattered more than the real market, then the
Browns would have been considered more successful and the Browns' quarterback would
have out-earned the Patriots' record-setting quarterback.20
That discussion of performance relative to expectations disregards an important
measure of each team's worth-its underlying value (that is, each team's starting point
relative to which expectations are set). This can be illustrated by building on Martin's
analogy: As of the start of the 2007 season, the Patriots averaged more than 11 wins per
season since 2001, appearing in the playoffs five times and winning three Super Bowls.2 1
In contrast, over the same time period, the Browns averaged fewer than six wins per
season, and lost in their one and only playoff appearance. 22 Given these historical
performances, the Patriots' pre-season odds for winning the year's Super Bowl (the
futures odds) 2 3 were better than the Browns'. 24 Martin notes that the Browns performed
better against the spread over the course of the season than the Patriots. As the Browns'
over-performed (relative to expectations), the Browns' odds to win the Super Bowl
improved.25 Nevertheless, the futures odds for the Patriots to win the Super Bowl
future performance-expectations about future earnings and expectations about the probability of liquidation
(and what shareholders would receive if it occurs).
18. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 21-24.
19. Id. at 23.
20. Id. at 23-24.
21. New England Patriots Franchise Encyclopedia, PRO-FOOTBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.pro-
football-reference.com/teams/nwe/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
22. Cleveland Browns Franchise Encyclopedia, PRO-FOOTBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.pro-
football-reference.com/teams/cle/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
23. Futures odds in the NFL reflect long-term projections for each team, incorporating the cumulative
expected performance over many games, rather than reflecting expected performance in just one game. This is
similar to the way a company's stock price reflects the long-term projections for the company, which
incorporate the cumulative expected performance of the company over many fiscal quarters, rather than over
just one fiscal quarter. Of course, futures odds, despite having longer term horizons than individual game
spreads, are for a particular term (they expire at the end of the relevant season), whereas stock prices do not
reflect a term-limited projection.
24. See Super Bowl XH Odds (2007 season), SPORTSODDSHISTORY.COM, www.sportsoddshistory.com/
aajphp/main.php?y=2007&s=nfl&a=sb&p-pre&o-r (last visited Dec. 27, 2012) (showing the betting lines for
Super Bowl XLII); Archived Super Bowl XII NFL Futures Odds from Just Prior to Preseason, 2007 to Win
Super Bowl 42, FOOTBALL LOCK (Feb. 3, 2008), www.footballlocks.com/nflfutures odds super bowl
XLII.shtml (showing Super Bowl XLII historical futures odds); Stephen Rhodes, Odds to Win 2008 Super
Bowl XII-Glendale AZ, February 3, 2008, NFL GRIDIRON GAB (July 22, 2007), www.nflgridirongab.com/
2007/07/22/odds-to-win-2008-super-bowl-xlii-glendale-az-february-3-2008/ (giving the odds for all 32 NFL
franchises of winning Super Bowl XLII).
25. Compare Super Bowl XII, OFFICIAL VEGAS TRAVEL SITE (Oct. 15, 2007),
http://web.archive.org/web/20071018045820/http://www.vegas.com/gaming/futures/superbowl.html
[hereinafter Week Six Super Bowl XII Odds] (showing that, during week six of the season, the Browns had
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Throwing the Red Flag
remained better than the Browns' futures odds even as the season progressed. 26
That is, a very bad team that outperforms expectations is likely to have its long-term
odds improve, while a very good team that underperforms may have its long-term odds
worsen,2 7 but the odds of the underperforming very good team should still be better than
the odds of the over-performing but very bad team. Similarly, a company's stock price,
like a team's long-term odds of winning the Super Bowl, reflects more than just under-
and over-performance relative to expectations in any particular period.
B. Understanding the Relationship Between the Bettor and the Organization that Is the
Subject of the Bet
A shareholder's ultimate economic claim (i.e., upon liquidation and winding up of
the investment) is against the company, whereas a sports bettor's economic claim is
against the bookie, not the team. Thus, a shareholder should always prefer the value of
the company to increase because the terminal value of stock upon liquidation depends
upon the company having value available to distribute.28 In contrast, a bettor is not
necessarily interested in increasingly good performance of the team that is the subject of
his bet; if he bets against the team, he prefers bad performance by the team. To him, it is
perfectly fine if the team loses all of its value (or games) because he does not depend on
the team for his economic entitlement-he depends on the creditworthiness of the
counterparty to the bet (i.e., the bookie). So too with derivatives, an investor in a
derivative generally does not depend on the company from whose securities the
derivative is derived; that company could lose all of its value, and the investor could still
reap rewards if he bet against the company's stock and the counterparty is creditworthy.
Thus, shareholders should have an incentive to desire success of the underlying
enterprise, whereas the sports bettors' and derivative investors' preferences about success
or failure of the underlying enterprise should depend on the directionality of their bets.
Further, a sports bettor's wager does not provide resources to the team; rather, the
wager merely facilitates the redistribution of existing funds among the actors in the
betting market. In contrast, a shareholder (at least upon an initial stock issuance) transfers
funds to the company; this investment is intended to provide capital that enables the
business to grow and generate additional valuable goods and services. Of course,
shareholders who acquire their stock in the secondary market do not contribute funds to
250/1 odds for winning the Super Bowl), with Super Bowl XII, OFFICIAL VEGAS TRAVEL SrrE (Nov. 14,
2007), http://web.archive.org/web/20071117100256/http://www.vegas.com/gaming/futures/superbowl.html
[hereinafter Week Eleven Super BowlXI Odds] (showing that, during week 11 of the season, the Browns had
125/1 odds for winning the Super Bowl).
26. Compare Week Six Super Bowl XII Odds, supra note 25 (showing that during week six, the futures
odds for the Patriots were 3/2 while the futures odds for the Browns were 250/1), with Week Eleven Super Bowl
XlII Odds, supra note 25 (showing that during week 11, the futures odds for the Patriots were 1/3 while the
futures odds for the Browns were 125/1).
27. Interestingly, the futures odds on the Patriots actually continued to improve as the season progressed.
See supra text accompanying note 26 (discussing the futures odds for the Patriots).
28. Of course, most public shareholders monetize through sales to other shareholders rather than through
redemptions upon liquidation. However, the value of a purchaser's long-term rights is reflected in the price at
which the stock changes hands. That price incorporation may not be perfect, but as a corporation approaches
liquidation or winding up, the stock price should increasingly reflect the value of the underlying assets available
for distribution upon liquidation and should decreasingly reflect expectations about future earnings.
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the company. However, any share purchased on the secondary market can be traced back
to initial issuance, upon which the initial shareholder did contribute something to the
business. Further, the existence of the secondary market arguably helps companies
because the initial investors, knowing that the secondary market provides liquidity, were
likely willing to pay more for their initial investment than they would have paid in the
absence of the liquidity provided by the secondary market. Thus, even stock purchased
on the secondary market reflects some contribution to the business. Sports bets never
provide value directly to the team in order to help the team grow. 29
Additionally, the timeframe for a sports bet and for a derivative contract is
commonly finite and short. 30 As a result, the bettor/investor can benefit from short-term
volatility and thus, may have an incentive to generate the volatility. In contrast, many
shareholders invest for the long-term.3 1 Of course, many shareholders invest for the
short-term, but unlike a sports bet or many derivative contracts, an investment in stock is
generally not time-limited by its own terms. Thus, the greater prevalence of long-term
investing in stocks suggests that shareholders are less likely to benefit from the
manufacture of volatility and may have more tolerance for business plans that produce
long-term benefits.
C. Calibrating the Concerns to the Context
Ultimately, shareholder ownership of the underlying enterprise matters. Because the
shareholders are bettors who also own a real stake in the underlying enterprise, some of
the problems Martin identifies as products of expectation markets (such as volatility
creation, the sacrifice of long-term growth for short-term benefits, and failure to
contribute to the growth of the pie) may be less likely to be problematic in the traditional
stock market than in sports betting or in derivatives trading. That is not to say the
problems do not exist in the stock market-they do. This is, of course, because the price
of any stock can be driven, to a significant extent, by the expectations about the
business's future earnings. Martin notes that the S&P 500 has traded on an average price-
to-earnings (P/E) ratio of 16:1, and he contends that this P/E ratio means that 94% of the
price of the stock is for "what stock investors collectively expect the company to do in
the future," whereas only six percent of the price of the stock is for "what is happening
now." 32 But this is an average. Price-to-earnings ratios can vary widely from company to
29. Arguably, sports betting can provide value to teams indirectly if betting increases fan interest and
viewership of the game, which in turn can increase advertising dollars and sponsorship fees received, but this is
much more attenuated. See generally John A. Fortunato, The Relationship of Fantasy Football Participation
with NFL Television Ratings, 3 J. SPORTS ADMIN. & SUPERVISION 74 (2011) (suggesting a positive correlation).
30. For example, I may bet that Team X will beat the spread in its game this weekend against Team Y.
Once the game is over, the winner of the bet is determined, the loser pays the winner, and the transaction is
over. Similarly, examples of derivatives include an option (for which the expiration date sets the date after
which the option ceases to confer any rights) or a futures contract (which articulates the date on which the
commodity subject to the contract is to be delivered, after which date, the contract is concluded).
31. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE FUTURE OF LONG-TERM INVESTING 13-21 (2011), available at
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF FutureLongTermlnvesting Report_2011 .pdf (explaining who long-term
investors are, discussing the magnitude of their long-term investments, and identifying stock in public and
private companies as potential investments for long-term investors).
32. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 220.
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company and industry to industry. 33 Employing Martin's use of P/E ratios as a proxy for
the role of the expectations market, 34 the higher the P/E ratio, the greater the role of the
expectations market in the pricing of the company's stock; conversely, where a company
has a very low P/E ratio, the expectations market arguably plays a much less dominant
role.
This suggests that perhaps Martin overstates the dangers of the expectation market
in the context of the traditional stock market (or, at the very least, in the context of certain
industries or particular companies), despite rightly emphasizing the severity of the
problems in the context of derivatives and hedge funds (which are entirely expectations-
market based). 35 When understanding and trying to respond to the adverse consequences
of an expectations-market orientation, we should recognize that the prominence of the
expectations market (and, thus, the problems it creates) varies by type of investment and
type of industry. As a result, we should be careful to ensure that regulatory responses and
private sector company-specific responses to the problems created by the expectations-
market orientation are proportionate to the magnitude of the problem in the particular
context.
Given that the critiques of the expectations market do resonate in the context of the
traditional stock market (even if this resonance is weaker than it is in the context of
derivatives), this Article's remaining two challenges address specific recommendations
that Martin makes about how businesses can shift away from the expectations market and
toward the real market.
II. CHALLENGE #2: BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, NFL PLAYERS, AND THE STRUCTURE OF
INCENTIVE COMPENSATION
When criticizing the use of stock compensation for executives, Martin analogizes
business executives to NFL players. 36 Using this analogy, he argues that, just as the NFL
prohibits insider participation in sports betting, American businesses should eliminate (or
at least reduce) the use of stock compensation for executives, thereby reducing insider
betting on the future of the company.3 7 Further, Martin argues that, to the extent that
businesses use monetary incentives for executives, the metrics for the incentives should
be grounded in the real market rather than in the expectations market, just as Tom Brady
should be compensated for his on-field performance (yards, touchdowns, wins) rather
than based on the number of times the Patriots beat the spread. 38 Moreover, Martin
argues that non-monetary incentives-for NFL players, "the feeling of pride in helping
his team win, in exciting the fans, and in being seen by his colleagues as working his
hardest on the task," and for business executives, "the feeling of pride in contributing to a
company's goal, in offering the best product or service to customers-should compete
33. See Aswath Pamodaran, PE Ratio by Sector, DAMODARAN ONLINE (Jan. 2012), http://pages.stem
.nyu.edu/-adamodar/New HomePage/datafile/pedata.htmI (providing P/E ratios for a wide variety of
industries).
34. P/E ratios may not, in fact, be good proxies for the role of the expectations market. For purposes of
this Article, however, I set that concern aside and accept (and argue within) Martin's framing.
35. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 157-90 (dedicating an entire chapter to investment managers).
36. Id. at 17-19, 87-129.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 127-28.
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closely [with monetary incentives]."39 Martin asserts that these changes can restore
authenticity to the lives of executives and can help executives focus on long-term
business profitability and value creation.40
But, again, there are important differences between business executives and NFL
players that suggest refinement of the analysis.
A. Valuing Efficient Markets
Despite the risks, the participation by executives in the stock market can reveal
valuable information, thereby helping increase the efficiency of the public stock
market,41 which is beneficial to society.42 In contrast, there is arguably little (if any)
societal value in ensuring an efficient sports gambling market, 43 so player betting on
sports primarily creates risks to the game, without also conferring benefits. 44 Thus, the
case against stock compensation for executives seems weaker than the case against sports
betting by NFL players.
However, the elimination of stock compensation, alone, would not prevent
executives' market efficiency-increasing function because executives could still trade in
the business's stock; the only difference would be that the executive would have to
purchase the stock with his own money rather than receiving the stock as
compensation. 45 Indeed, this could potentially be even more useful to the promotion of
39. Id. at 127.
40. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 127-29.
41. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 573-74 (1984) (discussing the decoding of trades by insiders as a way that markets can
become more efficient). There is debate about how efficient the market is and about whether, and the extent to
which, the information-revealing benefits of insider trading exceed the adverse consequences of such actions.
Nevertheless, this discussion proceeds on the understanding that trading by insiders can reveal valuable
information; similarly, this discussion treats as a separate issue the question of whether that information is
sufficiently valuable to overcome adverse consequences of such actions.
42. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857,
866 (1983) ("The social gains from efficient capital markets are well known. The more accurately prices reflect
information, the better prices guide capital investment in the economy. From the perspective of an individual
firm, ... efficient capital markets are a public good. . . .").
43. See Philip K. Gray & Stephen F. Gray, Testing Market Efficiency: Evidence from the NFL Sports
Betting Market, 52 J. FIN. 1725, 1729-31 (1997) (providing evidence of inefficiency in football betting).
Further, in order for NFL player participation in the betting market to increase meaningfully the efficiency of
that market, NFL player bets would have to be clearly and systematically disclosed to market participants, just
as there is mandated disclosure of business insiders' material actions with respect to company stock.
44. It may be noteworthy that NFL players participate in another aspect of the sports expectations
market-fantasy football. In fantasy football, participants set their "player rosters" based on their expectations
about player performance in an effort to amass the greatest number of points (points are awarded based on in-
game statistics, such as yards gained and touchdowns scored). Fantasy football participants win or lose in any
given week depending on how the players on their roster perform. NFL players regularly participate in fantasy
football, so their decision to draft themselves on to their team and to put themselves on their active roster for the
week reflects their assessment about their likely performance. See Fantasy Football Isn't Just for Fans-NFL
Players Are Hooked, NFL, http://www.nfl.con/news/story?template=with-video-with-comments&confirm
true&id=09000d5d8145ad3d (last visited Dec. 27, 2012) (discussing NFL players' participation in fantasy
football).
45. This difference could be merely formal rather than substantive if executives understood that it was
expected that they would own a certain number of shares and if the executives' cash compensation was
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an efficient market because executives would signal information to the market upon
purchase of the stock, and not solely upon sale of the stock. But Martin's
recommendation that executives "should be prevented from selling any stock, for any
reason, while serving in that capacity-and indeed for several years after leaving their
posts,"46 would inhibit the dissemination of information that can contribute to an efficient
market.
Given the contribution to market efficiency served by insider participation in the
market, perhaps it would be better just to limit the volume of stock an executive can sell
during his tenure with the company, rather than to bar such sales entirely. 47 The difficulty
would be setting the limit at an appropriate level-high enough so that meaningful
information could be shared with the market, but low enough to ensure that the
executives maintain a significant long-term stake in the company.
B. Designing Real-Market-Based Monetary Compensation
Despite his critique of stock compensation, Martin does admit that monetary
incentives can serve a useful purpose in motivating individuals to achieve specific goals.
However, he argues that, just as monetary incentives for NFL players are based on on-
field performance and not with reference to the spread on the game, monetary incentives
for business executives "should be grounded in the real market" and should not be based
on stock price.48 The importation of this real-market incentive approach into the business
world presents challenges because, among other reasons, real-market performance in the
NFL is much more easily measured-a player runs the ball a specific number of yards, a
quarterback throws for a specific number of touchdowns, a defensive back has a specific
number of interceptions, and a team has a specific number of wins. These measurements
are more difficult in business because it is hard to determine which employee created a
company's increased profitability, who increased a company's market share, and who
reduced employee turnover. Changes to these real market business measures are products
of many people working together, of the efforts from years ago by people who are no
longer with the company, and of market events over which the company employees may
have no control. 49 Of course, even NFL players do not accomplish their real-market
achievements alone (e.g., even Tom Brady needs receivers to catch his passes). Yet, in
the NFL, the accomplishments are more easily observable and objectively measurable-a
touchdown is always worth six points, the player with possession of the ball in the end
zone scores the touchdown, the team with more points at the end of the game is the
winner, and the team that wins the Super Bowl is the top team of the season. What is
equivalent in the business world where accounting practices change over time (or are
fudged), where businesses can use many different metrics to evaluate their success, and
increased by an amount sufficient to pay for the purchase of that number of shares on the open market.
46. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 121.
47. Current insider trading rules impose a variety of other limitations on the ability of executives to trade
in the stock of the companies they serve, including limits on the time periods during which executives can trade.
See generally DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION §§
1.12, 5.4 (Eric Smalley et al. eds., 2012).
48. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 127.
49. It is, of course, not a novel observation to note that designing incentive compensation can be quite
difficult when trying to incentivize individuals to contribute to activities that are measured in the aggregate.
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where there seems to be no consensus about what makes a company the victor over its
competitors or about the time frame over which victory is measured?
Moreover, using real-market incentives does not avoid opportunities to manipulate
the targets.50 Real-market incentives are structured so that the player/executive receives
additional compensation if he surpasses a particular threshold. But those thresholds are
often set through negotiation based on expectations, and the player/executive has an
incentive to try to lowball the expectation in order to make it easier to surpass, thereby
increasing the odds that he will receive the bonus. Imagine, for example, 5 1 a team
offering to pay a bonus to a running back (let's call him Willis McGahee) if he rushes for
more yards in the coming year than he did in the previous year. The running back's agent
might counter by arguing that the previous year was anomalous because the quarterback
(let's call him Tim Tebow) was so inexperienced that the team relied heavily on the
ground game, but that the team's acquisition of a great new quarterback (let's call him
Peyton Manning) means that, in the coming year, there will be a more even split between
the passing and running plays. Thus, the running back will argue that the previous year's
yardage is not the appropriate threshold for a performance bonus this year, and rather the
threshold should be much lower. 52 The same story can be told in the context of the
business world. Imagine a business that offers to pay a bonus to an executive if the
company increases its market share in the coming year more than it increased its market
share in the previous year. The executive's lawyer might counter by arguing that the
previous year's market share gains were anomalous because the company launched a new
product, but that another new product launch that could lead to a similar market share
increase is not planned for the coming year; thus, the executive could argue (rightly or
wrongly) that last year's rate of market share increase is not the appropriate threshold for
a performance bonus in the coming year, and rather the threshold should be much lower.
These games sound awfully similar to the earnings management 53 game that Martin
condemns for its inauthenticity 54 and for its short-term outlook.
Incentive targets are not the only things that can be manipulated. Similarly, real-
market-based incentives, like expectation-market-based incentives, are also susceptible to
the manipulation of the outputs.55 For example, in the NFL, Michael Strahan became the
all-time sack leader not when he made a great play, but rather when Brett Favre basically
50. See generally HOWARD M. SCHILIT, FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS: How TO DETECT ACCOUNTING
GIMMICKS & FRAUD IN FINANCIAL REPORTS (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the manipulability of a variety of real-
market business metrics).
51. 1 have no information to suggest that the negotiation described in the following example actually
occurred. Rather, I am posing a hypothetical situation, and I provide some context by illustrating the
hypothetical with real players.
52. Query how justifiable this argument is given that McGahee did not begin the prior year as the team's
starting running back, but he began the current year as the starter.
53. Perhaps the game is less likely to be successful in the bonus-threshold setting context because there
are fewer players involved and the players are likely to be repeat players who may be more effective at reigning
in this inauthentic activity.
54. As an aside, the NFL is hardly a bastion of authenticity when it comes to compensation. Just look at
the announcement of the worth of any player contract. For example, the $1o million contract that Michael
Vick signed in 2011 is virtually guaranteed not to pay Vick $ 100 million.
55. For example, a running back who is very close to his bonus threshold for yards gained might lobby
the coach for more carries even in a game that is a blowout.
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fell down to give Strahan the record. 56 And in business, executives could try to reach
targets for increased market share by diverting money from research and development to
advertising, even though this move could harm the business's long term prospects. Again,
these opportunities for manipulation of real-market metrics sound remarkably akin to the
opportunities for manipulation of expectation-market metrics that Martin criticizes. 57
Further, with any monetary incentive, it is critical to design the incentive so that the
individual's economic interests are as aligned as possible with the organization's
interests, such that opportunities for an individual to maximize his personal financial gain
at the expense of the organization are as infrequent as possible, and so that the individual
is not encouraged to take illegal or unethical actions in furtherance of his financial gain.
The New Orleans Saints bounty scandal is a recent illustration of how a financial
incentive can encourage improper behavior (i.e., deliberate efforts to physically harm
members of the opposing team) and can ultimately cause long-term harm to the
organization the incentive was designed to help (i.e., resulting in suspensions of coaches
and players, and harming the reputation of a beloved organization).58 Martin rightly
recognizes that these dangers of monetary incentives are present whether the incentive is
based on the expectations market or on the real market.5 9
The challenges of measurability, manipulability, and alignment of individual and
organizational incentives do not mean that we should abandon the idea of using real-
market-based monetary incentives for executives. I agree with Martin that this idea ought
to be pursued. However, design will be difficult. Martin does not claim that real-market-
based incentives are a panacea, but he is quite optimistic that, with "creativity" in design,
real-market-based monetary incentives can be employed to foster "more authentic
executives" and to encourage and reward long-term business growth. 60 I am less
sanguine. Either way, I think we would be wise to appreciate the challenges of designing
effective real-market-based monetary incentives and to accept that the use of monetary
incentives that are based on the real market does not solve all of the problems created by
use of monetary incentives that are based on the expectations market.
C. Employing Non-Monetary Incentives
Martin also argues that businesses should move beyond monetary incentives and
incorporate non-monetary psychological compensation in order to "focus executives on
56. Mike Freeman, On Pro Football; Cheap Sack Will Cost Favre and Strahan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/07/sports/on-pro-football-cheap-sack-will-cost-favre-and-strahan.html.
57. Indeed, depending on the individual case, expectations-market players may have more difficulty
discovering manipulation of real-market metrics than expectations-market metrics.
58. See Saints Bounty Scandal, ESPN (Dec. 5, 2012), http://espn.go.com/nfl/topics/_/page/new-orleans-
saints-bounty-scandal (discussing the scandal and its sanctions). Even monetary incentives that generally align
individual and organizational interests can present opportunities for individuals to sacrifice organizational goals
for individual benefits. See Michael Conlin & Patrick M. Emerson, Multidimensional Separating Equilibria and
Moral Hazard: An Empirical Study of National Football League Contract Negotiations, 85 REV. EcoN. &
STAT. 760, 763 (2003) (finding that players exert more effort in the last year of their contracts than during the
regular term of the contracts).
59. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 1, at 125 (using an incident with Sears as an illustration of the potential
for misdeeds).
60. Id. at 128-29.
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real and meaningful goals." 61 In the NFL, such non-monetary incentives include a
player's desire to help his team win, "to excite fans, and to be seen by his colleagues as
working his hardest on the task." 62 Additionally, these incentives can include a player's
desire to be valued by his community (as the Saints value Drew Brees) and to be an
integral part of a community that is valued by him and others (as the people of New
Orleans value the Saints).63 In business, non-monetary incentives could include "pride in
doing a great job for ... his city, [and] his customers," 64 and "pride in contributing to
[his] company's goal [and] in offering the best product or service to customers." 65
Admittedly, these feelings can be incredibly powerful and can spur an individual to
do everything he can for his organization. But these attitudes are more intrinsic to certain
people and less to others, and these values are more inherent in some organizational
cultures but less in others. 66 Examples of the power of non-monetary incentives are easy
to find in the NFL.67 In important games for their teams, Brian Westbrook and Maurice
Jones-Drew each knelt down shortly before the goal line to help secure a team win, rather
than score, pad personal statistics, and risk the chance that the other team might score in
the game's waning seconds. 68 Players regularly put their personal health and safety at
risk to help their teams win; this is true even though players know that the long-term
health repercussions of playing football can be quite serious. 69 And big name players
such as Tom Brady and Peyton Manning have agreed to restructure their contracts in
order to help their teams put together rosters that are more likely to win. 70 The NFL is a
culture that values camaraderie and winning, so an opportunity to make an important
contribution to a team's success can be a powerful non-monetary incentive for players.
Similarly, the organization and executives must value customer delight in order for
the opportunity to contribute to the company's creation of customer delight to provide a
powerful non-monetary incentive for business executives. Martin gives examples of
companies, such as Johnson & Johnson and Apple, which place a very high value on the
61. Id. at 39.
62. Id. at 127.
63. Id. at 101-03.
64. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 106.
65. Id. at 127.
66. Cf Patricia Casey Douglas et al., The Effect of Organizational Culture and Ethical Orientation on
Accountants' Ethical Judgments, 34 J. BUs. ETHIcs 101, 103-05 (2001) (discussing how differences in
organizational culture can affect individual decision making).
67. The military is another organization where individuals regularly subordinate individualism in favor of
organizational success.
68. Michael C. Wright, Competitive Jones-Drew Unaccustomed to Not Scoring, FLA. TIMES UNION, Nov.
15, 2009, http://jacksonville.com/sports/football/jaguars/2009-l1-15/story/competitivejones drew
unaccustomedtonotscoring; Eagles RB Westbrook Credits Runyan for His Stop Inside 1-Yard Line, CBS
SPORTS (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/story/10534431.
69. See Ben McGrath, Does Football Have a Future? The NFL and the Concussion Crisis, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 31, 2011), www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/01/31/110131fa fact_mcgrath (discussing the impact of
serious head injuries incurred by individuals playing professional football).
70. Erik Frenz, Tom Brady Restructures Contract, How Can New England Patriots Use Extra Money?,
BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 22, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1115180-tom-brady-restructures-
contract-how-can-new-england-patriots-use-extra-money; Manning Restructures Contract to Save Colts Cap
Room, ESPN (Feb. 21, 2007, 5:39 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/storyid=2773817.
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customer experience and subordinate the goal of maximizing shareholder value.71 But for
companies where customer delight, production of social goods, and/or community pride
are not already part of the organizational ethic, how can a business use these non-
monetary incentives to "focus executives on real and meaningful goals"? 72 To overcome
this "chicken and egg" problem, business must transition, and that transition requires, at
least in part, convincing executives to value these non-monetary rewards. 73
Martin rightly notes that business culture can change, as it did after the Jensen and
Meckling article that reoriented business to focus on shareholder value maximization. 74 1
submit that a shift in the other direction will be more difficult in part because it is much
harder to measure these non-monetary benefits than it is to measure stock price.
Moreover, even if a business's executives all value these non-monetary benefits, the
executives likely value the benefits differently, meaning that it may be difficult to design
a comprehensive incentive plan tailored to each executive. Ultimately, efforts to redesign
executive compensation packages (so that they include less stock compensation, rely
more on real-market-based monetary incentives, and make greater use of non-monetary
incentives) in order to increase authenticity and facilitate long-term value creation may be
desirable, but they are likely more difficult than Martin acknowledges.
III. CHALLENGE #3: BUSINESS CUSTOMERS, NFL FANS, AND THE MAXIMIZATION OF
CUSTOMER DELIGHT
When criticizing business for its focus on shareholder value maximization rather
than on the maximization of customer delight, Martin analogizes business customers to
NFL fans, 75 arguing that, just as the NFL focuses on fans rather than owners, American
business should focus on customers rather than shareholders. He explains that, "[w]ith
fans and the real game as the focus [of the NFL], owners have indeed done just fine." 76
Similarly, Martin contends that, in business, "customer delight is a more powerful
objective than shareholder value . . . [and] if you take care of customers, shareholders
will be drawn along for a very nice ride."77
But, once more, there is a critical weakness in the analogy: NFL owners are
generally also NFL fans,78 but company shareholders may or may not be company
71. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 44-50, 65-66.
72. Id. at 39.
73. Alternatively, a business could fire its executives and just hire new people who do value these things.
Either way, the executives' values matter because they can permeate throughout an organization. See Yair
Berson et al., CEO Values, Organizational Culture & Firm Outcomes, 29 J. ORG. BEHAv. 615, 619 (2008)
(contending that "organizational culture" is a predictor of organizational outcomes).
74. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 10-14 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976)).
75. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 37-38, 79-80.
76. Id. at 80.
77. Id. at 85.
78. For example, Robert Kraft, owner of the New England Patriots since 1994, has been a fan of the team
since the early 1960s. Robert Kraft: Chairman and CEO, NEW ENG. PATRIOTS, http://www.patriots.com/
team/staff/robert-kraft/e4afl3f7-fel9-430c-9485-e3fel7042ca6 (last visited Dec. 27, 2012). The biographies of
many other team owners similarly indicate that the owner is also a fan. Moreover, owners' reactions to
watching their teams play and owners' reactions to lifting the Lombardi Trophy at the end of a Super Bowl-
winning season easily demonstrate that owners are also fans of the game. However, the interests of NFL owners
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customers. Thus, NFL owners likely get utility out of the fan experience, 79 but
shareholders may not get utility out of the customer experience.
Generally, if an investor gets utility out of something (e.g., environmentally
sustainable practices of a business) other than a monetary return on his investment, the
investor's total return on investment includes both the monetary return and the value of
that additional item. Thus, as the corporate social responsibility literature discusses, 80
such an investor may be willing to accept a lower monetary return on his investment than
he would in the absence of the non-monetary item. The Green Bay Packers provide a
stark example of this phenomenon in the NFL. The Packers recently completed its fifth
public offering of stock, offering shares of Packer stock at $250 per share and adding
more than 250,000 new shareholders.8 1 The offering documents stated that investors
should not expect any monetary return on this investment; the Packers do not pay
dividends, and if an owner wishes to sell his stock, he must offer it for sale first to the
Packer organization for just pennies. 82 Given these terms, each person who subscribes for
Packer stock must believe that the non-monetary return (e.g., the pride of being a fan-
owner) is sufficiently valuable to justify investing in the team, even without the prospect
of receiving any financial return on the investment. 83 Profits and on-field performance
are often at odds in professional sports, 84 and thus, an owner's willingness to sacrifice the
profits in favor of the on-field performance must mean that the owner gets value not just
and NFL fans are not entirely aligned. There is ample evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., Sean Leahy, Roger
Goodell Pens Letter to Fans About NFL CBA Talks, USA TODAY, Jan. 3, 2011,
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/20 11/0 1/roger-goodell-pens-letter-to-fans-about-nfl-
cba-talks/1 (discussing the NFL commissioner's efforts to persuade fans of the merit in the NFL's and owners'
position on the collective bargaining agreement negotiations with the players' union); Phil Gentile, Why the
NFL Desperately Needs to Address Preseason Ticket Prices, BLEACHER REPORT (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1311081-why-the-nfl-desperately-needs-to-address-preseason-ticket-prices
(noting that fans complain about being charged full-ticket prices for preseason games when stars rarely play).
79. Similarly, when NFL owners sacrifice profits for victory, they may also get utility out of their ability
to help create what is essentially a public good (i.e., enjoyment of wins from which individuals cannot be
effectively excluded and use of which by one individual does not reduce the availability of this good to others)
for the team's fan base. Thanks to John Crawford for this (and other) insights. Query how commonly businesses
create a similar public good and how commonly shareholders in such businesses may value the creation of such
public goods.
80. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733,
783-96 (2005) (contending that the maximization of total shareholder welfare requires the consideration of both
financial and non-financial utility derived by shareholders from corporate action).
81. Shareholders, GREEN BAY PACKERS, www.packers.com/community/shareholders.html (last visited
Dec. 27, 2012); Packers Stock Sale Underway: $250 Shares to Support Lambeau Field Expansion, GREEN BAY
PACKERS (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.packers.com/news-and-events/article-I/Packers-stock-sale-underway-250-
shares-to-support-Lambeau-Field-expansion/17178be6-6fdc-49a2-bffe-d650bda38ef5.
82. See Rich Smith, Green Bay Packers Stock Offering: Packers 12, Shareholders 0, DAILY FIN. (Dec. 7,
2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/12/07/green-bay-packers-stock-offering-packers-12-shareholders-0/
(summarizing the terms of the offering).
83. Id. (arguing that Packers fans are "chumps" to invest in Packers stock). A rational investor would not
invest unless he received some utility out of the investment. Given that the offering was quickly subscribed,
many investors clearly found value in the opportunity to be a fan-owner.
84. A team owner may try to increase the chances of winning by adding increasingly talented (and thus
increasingly expensive) players to the roster. With its revenue sharing and salary cap rules, I think the NFL
balances tension between profits and performance better than most other professional sports leagues, but the
tension still remains.
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from the former but from the latter as well.
Similarly, if a corporation's owner is also a customer or otherwise gets significant
utility out of customer delight, he may be willing to accept a lower financial return than
he would otherwise be able to achieve from a comparable investment. In this case, the
corporation should likely, as Martin advocates, focus its efforts on maximizing the
quality of the customer experience. If, however, a corporation needs additional capital, a
focus on maximizing customer delight rather than share value may cause the corporation
to have trouble selling additional stock 85 unless: (1) the additional equity investors are
also willing to accept reduced returns because they already value customer delight, 86 (2)
the additional equity investors can be convinced to value customer delight so that they
become willing to accept lower financial returns, 87 or (3) the additional equity investors
believe that maximizing customer delight will ultimately maximize share value (i.e., that
they lose nothing, and may actually gain, if the business focuses on the customer
experience).88
The first seems unlikely in today's public companies, in general. Given the widely
dispersed ownership of public corporations in the United States, it is unlikely that all (or
even a majority) of shareholders find utility in the customer experience of the companies
in which they own stock, assuming that each shareholder even knows whether he is a
customer of each of the companies he owns. 89 Surely, it is reasonable to assume that the
percentage of NFL owners that value the fan experience (likely the vast majority) is
higher than the percentage of shareholders in public companies that value the customer
experience those companies provide. There may be some companies in which investors
are willing to accept lower returns because the investors value the customer delight that
the companies provide, but it is difficult to find evidence that investors are flocking to
85. Such a corporation should have less trouble borrowing money because lenders receive a fixed, not
residual, return and because the corporation must pay lenders before stockholders.
86. Cf David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523,
525-30 (2011) (discussing the "constituency model of corporate social responsibility" in which shareholder
returns may be reduced in order to benefit another constituency); Hoje Jo et al., Socially Responsible Investing
vs. Vice Investing 2 (Acad. & Bus. Res. Inst., Working Paper No. LVI0107, 2010), available at
www.aabri.com/LV201OManuscripts/LVI0107.pdf (explaining that the "value-discounting hypothesis" of
socially responsible investing means that "investors who care about ethical aspects of investing may derive non-
financial utility by holding assets consistent with SRI criteria and are willing to forego return to avoid holding
unethical assets thus bringing down the rate of return").
87. This is just a variant on the constituency model of corporate social responsibility. See Millon, supra
note 86, at 525-30 (discussing the constituency model).
88. Id. at 530-39 (discussing the "sustainability model of corporate social responsibility," in which
advancing the interests of non-shareholder constituencies ultimately inures to the benefit of all constituencies);
Jo et al., supra note 86, at 3 (explaining that the "value-enhancing hypothesis" of socially responsible investing
means that "SRI portfolios can outperform conventional counterparts" if, for example, "socially responsible
corporate policies are considered of value to consumers and employees, [such that] sales will increase and
employee relations will improve, [thereby] translat[ing] into a higher firm value").
89. Given the prevalence of mutual fund investing (meaning that a shareholder may not know exactly
which stocks he effectively owns at any given time) and given corporate conglomerate structures (meaning that
a shareholder might not realize that a particular product is produced by a particular corporation in which she
owns stock), shareholder-customers might not even be able to identify the companies in which they are both
owners and customers. If an individual cannot correlate a particular customer experience with a particular stock,
it is hard for that individual to include the value of the customer experience when calculating his total return on
investment.
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invest in such companies.
The second is a possibility but may be a long shot. Social movements and priorities
change over time and can be reflected in investing decisions. Recall that as the public
increasingly rallied against South African apartheid, shareholders (in particular, states
and localities) increasingly divested themselves of South African companies, choosing to
invest elsewhere. 90 However, changing attitudes and perceptions takes time, and
investors must find the cause to be sufficiently compelling. Increasing customer delight
may not resonate as powerfully with investors as did opposing the human rights
violations of apartheid.
The third is Martin's view-that a corporation that focuses on its customers will
ultimately do right by its shareholders.91 He argues that the NFL is an example of the
success of this approach, and he gives examples of corporations, such as Johnson &
Johnson and Apple, that have grown to great prominence and value by employing a
customer-first approach. 92 Martin may be correct that the best way to maximize
shareholder value is to focus on maximizing customer delight, but I do not think that the
book makes a conclusive case that this is so.93 I do, however, think the book makes a
very strong case that the customer-focused approach is worthwhile for businesses to try if
they believe the strategy might work in their particular contexts. Even assuming that
Martin is correct about customer focus leading to the maximization of shareholder value,
it may take a long time for a company's customer-focused approach to result in a
significant increase in shareholder value. Thus, the company would need shareholders
with sufficiently long time horizons and investors who are also customers or who have
enough confidence in the customer-focused approach that they are willing to support the
company and ensure its financial viability until the value increase is realized. Not every
company has the luxury of having these types of shareholders. Indeed, private companies
are much more likely than public companies to be in this position, meaning that Martin's
analysis suggests that companies ought to stay private to the extent it is at all possible.
90. See generally Jennifer Frankel, The Legal and Regulatory Climate for Investment in Post-Apartheid
South Africa: An Historical Overview, 6 CARDOZo J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 183, 191-94 (1998) (providing an
overview of the anti-apartheid divestment by states, localities, and businesses).
91. Some of what Martin states in his book could be read to support the first alternative-that
shareholders may be willing to accept a slightly lower return because they value customer delight. For example,
Martin refers to owners being "just fine" and going for a "very nice ride," and he refers to Johnson & Johnson's
philosophy of providing a "fair return" (not a maximum return) to shareholders. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 47,
80, 85. However, I had the opportunity to listen to Martin speak about his book at the Commonwealth Club in
San Francisco, and I asked him about this directly. In a very brief conversation, he confirmed that he is not
advocating that investors should accept lower returns so that businesses can delight customers; rather, he
confirmed that his position is that customer focus ultimately leads to maximum value creation for shareholders.
Conversation with Roger Martin, Dean, University of Toronto's Rotman School of Management, in S.F., Cal.
(June 21, 2012).
92. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 63-66.
93. The customer-focused approach may work in some situations, but there is no assurance. Some
companies thrive despite poor customer experiences. For example, Walmart, which is among the world's largest
companies (as measured by market capitalization), recently ranked "dead last" among department and discount
stores in customer satisfaction according to the American Customer Satisfaction Index. Press Release, Am.
Customer Satisfaction Index, Tepid Rise in Customer Satisfaction Mimics Pace of Economic Recovery (Feb.
2012), available at http://www.theacsi.org/index.php?option=com-content&view-article&id=275&Itemid=
349.
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CONCLUSION
Martin's creative analogy between American business and the NFL facilitates our
ability to reflect on the current state of business and helps us to devise ideas about how to
improve business laws and strategies. Yet, the analogy's fit is far from perfect. Thus, the
challenges levied in this Article seek to advance the analysis by identifying the
weaknesses in the analogy and explaining their implications. Ultimately, it is only with
this nuanced understanding that we can determine how to successfully import the lessons
from the NFL into the context of American business.

